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THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973: NATIONAL
LEGISLATION AS INTERNATIONAL LAW
"Fear of war" has become an increasingly prominent factor af-
fecting the behavior of nations. Rapid technological advances in
weaponry during the twentieth century' have magnified the conse-
quences of the use of armed force.2 War has become so potentially
destructive that customary international law has changed radically as
nations have sought to avoid catastrophe.3 The carnage of World
War I precipitated the first steps toward what has become a continu-
ing theme in customary international law: the reduction of armed
conflict.4
Widely recognized pronouncements of customary international
law restricting the use of force have been made on several occasions
during this century. The Covenant of the League of Nations,5 the
Kellogg-Briand Pact6 and the Charter of the United Nations 7 are
1. See Firmage, The "War of National Liberation" and the Third World, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 304-05 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
2. Id. The author points to the increasing rate of the "tempo of technology." Since
World War II, the technology of weaponry has undergone a complete change every four to five
years. This technological advance has now reached the point where nations are "afraid" to use
the nuclear weapons at their disposal. The presence of these weapons has made an impact on
political, economic and military institutions.
3. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 66-67
(1963); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 397 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963). The catalyst for
this change was the creation of the League of Nations in 1919. When the League Covenant
first appeared, its strictures on the resort to war were the exception rather than the rule. Fol-
lowing its introduction, however, State practice began to change. Pacific settlement of disputes
was a concept introduced in the League Covenant which found its way into bilateral treaties,
regional security pacts and multilateral conventions. The Permanent Court of International
Justice began operation in 1921 as a forum for pacific settlement. By 1945 it was possible to
argue that the nations which began making aggressive war in 1939 had acted in contravention
of international law.
4. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 410.
5. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Versailles,
June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 189 [hereinafter cited as Versailles Treaty]. The League Cove-
nant was a part of this peace treaty.
6. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter cited as Kellog-Briand Pact].
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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prominent examples.' Although documents such as these are consid-
ered definitive statements of customary rules,9 they are not the sole
source of such law.'° Evidence of a customary rule is also found in
State actions taken pursuant to the law's terms," which in turn con-
tribute significantly to both the content and the validity of the cus-
tomary rule. 2
In 1973, the United States Congress passed the War Powers
Resolution,13 which enables Congress to limit the use of force by the
United States government' 4 by requiring the President to obtain con-
gressional approval before introducing troops into hostile situations
abroad for more than sixty days.' 5 As such, the War Powers Resolu-
tion reduces the probability of the United States involving itself in
armed conflict. The viability of the War Powers Resolution, how-
ever, has recently been challenged.' 6 Reservations expressed con-
cerning its constitutionality 17 have compounded previously existing
problems of enforcement.'" While the viability of the War Powers
Resolution as legislation may be questionable, its provisions call for
government action which would effectively conform United States
practice to the current customary rule restricting the use of armed
force. '9 Therefore, any analysis of the viability and future of the War
Powers Resolution must take into account its relevance as both evi-
dence of, and a contribution to customary international law.
This Comment examines the value of the War Powers Resolu-
tion to customary international law concerning armed conflict. First,
8. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at ch. VII.
9. See id. at 112, 120.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16 and 17.
11. Id.
12. See generally L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS (1959). The United States has
played a major role in the development of customary international law to reduce armed con-
flict. For example, the League of Nations was the brainchild of President Woodrow Wilson.
Also, the United States hosted the United Nations Conference on International Organization
and presently serves as the home of the United Nations Organization. A substantial portion of
the UN budget comes from United States coffers. Of the many functions carried out by the
United Nations, peacekeeping has been considered a matter of first importance.
13. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541 - 1548 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as War Powers Resolution].
14. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
15. See infra text accompanying note 115.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 120-61.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. A clear statement of this customary rule is found in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
United Nations Charter. This is the centerpiece of contemporary international law concerned
with reducing armed conflict. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 414.
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the elements and evidence of customary international law will be
briefly examined. By following the application of customary norms
to armed conflict, the development of the rule which restricts resort
to armed force will be shown. Next, the War Powers Resolution will
be examined, and a survey of its provisions and legislative history
will be used to exhibit its purposes and effects. A look at the recent
challenges to the validity of the War Powers Resolution will com-
plete a scenario of the legislation's current status. Finally, it will be
argued that the War Powers Resolution is a State action influenced
by customary international law which holds the potential for contrib-
uting to that law.
I. THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Custom is a long-standing source of international law.20
Although it is old enough to be considered the original source of law
in general, 21 customary principles are still relied upon today as a ma-
jor source of growth and redefinition in international law.22 During
the twentieth century, 23 a change in customary international law re-
garding armed conflict has been illustrated by States' actions and the
development of international legal instruments.
A. Elements of Custom
In the legal sense, "custom" means more than the habit of fol-
lowing a particular practice. 24 Custom in international law is com-
prised of two basic elements:25 (1) a general practice followed by
States and (2) opiniojuris, the acceptance by States of that practice as
law.26 The first element is established through State actions.27 The
second element is established when States feel obligated to take those
actions. 28 The process of establishing these elements involves a
20. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1948).
21. Id. at 25.
22. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 31 (1972).
23. BRIERLY, supra note 3 at 397.
24. Id. at 59.
25. See generally Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1 (1974). There is disagreement among legal scholars as to the precise elements of custom;
however, these two basic elements are generally accepted as mandatory.
26. THIRLWAY, supra note 22, at 46 (quoting G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1967)).
27. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1979).
28. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 25; BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 61.
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number of factors.29
When considering whether a certain kind of action is "a general
practice followed by States," several guidelines are used. Initially,
the action is examined in light of the duration, consistency, and per-
vasiveness which it entails.3" No set formula is currently used to de-
termine exactly how many States must follow a course of action, or
exactly how long that course of action must be followed before it is
deemed a "general practice."'" A course of action that is widely fol-
lowed may become a general practice in a relatively short time.32 On
the other hand, action taken by only a few States may take centuries
to be so deemed.33
The element of obligation is also difficult to formulate since it
involves a "feeling." 34 The feeling which must be present is that if a
practice is not followed, there will (or at least should be) some sort of
sanction imposed.35 Although the feeling of impending sanction may
seem to be an amorphous concept, it is the obligation to follow a
practice, as opposed to a motive such as comity or morality, which
establishes the second element of custom.3 6
When both of these elements are found in connection with a
particular State action, it becomes part of customary international
29. AKEHURST, supra note 25; BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 59-62; BROWNLIE, supra note
27, at 6.
30. See BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 6.
31. Id.
32. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 637, 645 (3d ed. 1962); OPPENHEIM, supra
note 20, at 631-635. In 1945 President Harry S. Truman delivered Presidential Proclamations
2667 and 2668, which contained a new United States policy regarding natural resources of the
continental shelf. The United States claimed jurisdiction over all resources in the seabed and
subsoil of the continental shelf contiguous to United States coastline, and limited jurisdiction
over coastal fisheries. This idea was new to international law. Much of the area affected by
these proclamations was considered to be the high seas, where the United States previously had
no jurisdiction. However, the concept was so widely adopted by coastal nations that by 1958 it
was considered to be a rule of customary international law and included in the Convention on
the Continental Shelf adopted by the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.
33. See The Paquete Habana, The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In this case the United
States Supreme Court was presented with the question of the status of coastal fishing vessels
during wartime. Two Cuban fishing boats had been captured as prizes of war by the United
States Navy during the Spanish-American War. The owner sued to recover them. The Court
looked to "ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries before and gradually
ripening into a rule of international law." The rule which had developed among seafaring
States was that coastal fishing boats were exempt from capture as prizes of war. The Court
decreed that the boats be returned to their owner.
34. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 25; BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 61.
35. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 59.
36. BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 8.
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law.37 State actions which satisfy the two elements of custom are
sometimes called "evidence" of custom."a However, not every action
taken by a State or one of its agents is intended to have the gravity of
a customary rule.3 9 The particular actor4" and the surrounding cir-
cumstances are also crucial considerations.41 State actions which are
considered important evidence of customary international law in-
clude diplomatic correspondence, recitals in treaties and legislative
enactments.4 2 During the twentieth century, State actions of this na-
ture have evidenced a marked change in international law concerning
armed force4" as States have developed new standards for "accepta-
ble" use of force which contrast sharply with centuries of previous
practice.44
B. Early Application to Armed Conflict
Until this century a State's resort to arms was an accepted
method of implementing its foreign policy. 4 Ancient societies, even
those considered highly "civilized" such as the Greek city-states,
fought wars for reasons which today might seem trivial.46  As the
study of international law first developed, 47 efforts were made to dis-
tinguish between "just" and "unjust" wars,48 although this classifica-
37. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 25-26; BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 59-60; BROWNLIE,
supra note 27, at 6.
38. BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 5; BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 59-60.
39. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 60; see THIRLWAY, supra note 22, at 31.
40. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 60. Low-ranking officials entrusted only with the chores of
daily operation are unlikely to be instrumental in establishing customary rules.
41. Id. Important actors, such as the Secretary of State, are not expected to weigh every
word spoken in casual conversation. However, what they say in a meeting with foreign diplo-
mats would constitute an official State action. A communique issued from such a meeting
would consitute evidence of customary international law.
42. See BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 5; BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 61. Other sources
include: policy statements, press releases, opinions of official legal advisors, official manuals on
legal questions, orders to armed forces, international and national judicial decisions, a pattern
of treaties in the same form and the practice of international organs.
43. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 397-98.
44. See supra note 3.
45. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 3.
46. Id.
47. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 6-18. This development was taking place
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Many of the ideas used came from earlier works
of theologians.
48. Id. at 3-50. Many of the "classic" writers on international law devoted works to this
effort. Men like Grotius and Vattel set out fairly well-defined criteria for a "just war." Retri-
bution for a perceived wrong or pursuit of new territory were seen as perfectly valid reasons for
calling out the army against another State.
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tion did little to inhibit armed conflict.49 The first major steps
toward reducing armed conflict did not come until the advent of the
First World War.50
The Treaty of Versailles,5 ' the peace treaty which officially
ended World War I,5 contained the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions.53 The Covenant called for arms redution54 and arbitration of
disputes in lieu of resort to aggression.55 Resort to arms was prohib-
ited if not kept within defined limits.56 These provisions exhibited a
complete change in attitude toward armed conflict. 7
This prohibition was carried further by the Pact of Paris (Kel-
logg-Briand Pact).5 The Kellogg-Briand Pact condemned recourse
to war59 and called for peaceful settlement of all disputes. 60 To-
gether, the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact served as a point
of departure from States' prior willingness to engage in the use of
49. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 398; BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 3-18.
50. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 397.
51. Versailles Treaty, supra note 5.
52. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 n.87 (1966). Germany was
actually granted an armistice on November I1, 1918. The Versailles Treaty was not signed
until 1919.
53. Versailles Treaty, supra note 5, Part I: LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT.
54. Id. art. 80 provides:
1. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace re-
quires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with na-
tional safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances
of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and ac-
tion of the several Governments.
3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten
years.
4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the
limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of
the Council.
5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise
of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall
advise how the evil effects attendant upons such manufacture can be prevented, due
regard being had to necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to
manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.
6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank infor-
mation as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes
and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.
55. Id.; art 12.
56. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 408.
57. Id.; BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 66-67.
58. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 6.
59. Id. art. I. "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their re-
spective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controver-
sies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
60. Id. art. II. "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise
among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
Vol. 15
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armed force.6' These two widely-subscribed62 treaties recorded this
attitude change in customary international law, setting new stan-
dards for State conduct regarding the use of force.6 3 As the Twenti-
eth Century progressed, these standards were further developed.
C. The United Nations Charter
By 1945 the standards of the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand
Pact had developed into a customary rule through the practice of
nations.64 In that year the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization adopted the Charter of the United Nations.65
The Charter's preamble states that the determination of the "Peoples
of the United Nations . . . [is] to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war."66 Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter has been
called "the cornerstone of the Charter system, '"67 and states: "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."
6
The Charter further developed standards restricting the resort to
armed force in two ways. First, the language of Article 2(4) went
beyond the terms of the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to
restrict the threat or use of force.69 The change first recorded after
World War I was thus refined and restated in its contemporary
form.70 Second, the purpose underlying the Charter7 and its subse-
61. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 410.
62. A. TOYNBEE, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1286, 2393, 2396
(1967). The Covenant had thirty-two original signatories. The Kellogg-Briand Pact had fifteen
original signatories and forty-three accessions.
63. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 410.
64. Id. at 112.
65. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS iii (1946) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED
DOCUMENTS].
66. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
67. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 414.
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
69. L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 104 (1949).
70. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 112, 120.
71. See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 69, at 93-121. The purposes and principles of
the UN Charter are stated in chapter 1, which contains articles I and 2. Article 1 lists the
Charter's purposes, the first of which is to "maintain international peace and security." Article
2 states the principles to be followed by UN Members in pursuit of the purposes set out in
article 1. U.N. CHARTER arts. I & 2. Thus, one of the basic tenets of the UN is the preserva-
tion of international peace and security via restraints on unilateral uses of force. See also
GOODRICH, supra note 12.
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quent effect on State practice crystalized the statement made in Arti-
cle 2(4) into a rule of customary international law.
72
Application of the elements of customary international law to
Article 2(4) illustrates the rapid incorporation into international law
of the rule stated therein. The first element of customary interna-
tional law, as previously set out, is "a general practice followed by
States." 7 3 Wide-spread adherence to the restriction on the threat or
use of force was evidenced soon after the signing of the Charter. By
1960, thirty-nine multilateral treaties had been enacted expressing
the intention of signatory States to restrict their use of force.74
Thirty-five of those treaties referred expressly to the strictures found
in Article 2(4). 7" During that same brief period, seventy-four diplo-
matic communications reaffirmed the new principle, with express ref-
erences to Article 2(4) in fifteen instances.7 6 Seven nations enacted
constitutions which contained provisions forbidding resort to aggres-
sive war.7 7 One national constitution went so far as to renounce war
as an instrument of national policy.7" Legislative enactments during
this period included designation of certain acts as "crimes against
peace." 7 9 Yet perhaps the most significant and widespread State
practice reaffirming the rule stated by Article 2(4) has been signing
the UN Charter. °
The second element, opiniojuris, is perhaps harder to illustrate.
The "feeling" among States that sanctions should be imposed is diffi-
cult to show unless an event regarded as a violation of the customary
rule occurs. One such event was the invasion of Afghanistan by the
Soviet Union in 1979.8" The United States immediately condemned
this action as a violation of Article 2(4).2 The Carter Administra-
72. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 12. The fact that the vast majority of States are signato-
ries of the UN Charter illustrates the wide acceptance of the basic principles which it contains.
73. See supra text accompanying note 26.
74. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 127-29.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 187 n.5. These were the constitutions of Cuba, France,
the Federal Repubic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the Republic of Korea,
Nicaragagua and Venezuela.
78. Id. This was the constitution of Burma.
79. See, e.g., id. at 188 n.1. These statutes used the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal as
their model. The notion of a "crime against the peace" was unknown before the advent of the
League of Nations and the United Nations.
80. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1983).
81. Transcript of President's Speech on Soviet Military Intervention, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5,
1980, at A6, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Transcript of President's Speech ].
82. Id. President Carter termed the Soviet action "a callous violation of international law
Vol. 15
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tion invoked sanctions against the Soviet Union, including a grain
embargo and curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in United States
waters.83 President Carter also advocated a boycott of the 1980 Sum-
mer Olympics to be held in Moscow.84 Sixty nations eventually boy-
cotted the Moscow Olympics,85 ten more than the original
membership of the United Nations.86
Manifestations of opinio juris in reaction to incidences such as
the invasion of Afghanistan, and the "general practice" of States
have illustrated that both of the elements of customary international
law are found in the rule of Article 2(4). State actions conforming to
that rule provide evidence of its scope and continued viability,
thereby becoming part of customary international law.87
II. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973
In the United States, the power to conduct warfare is constitu-
tionally divided between the President and Congress. Congress has
the power to declare war, provide armed forces and finance military
operations.8 8 The President has power as commander-in-chief of
United States armed forces.89 As the Vietnam War progressed, con-
cern grew that war-making powers were gravitating toward the Pres-
ident, leaving Congress with a diminishing influence on the use of the
armed forces.9° In an effort to reassert its war-making authority,91
and the United Nations Charter." See also Nanda, U.S. Action in Grenada Raises Questions of
International Law, Den. Post, Oct. 31, 1983, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
83. Transcript of President's Speech, supra note 81. The UN Charter provides for the
imposition of economic sanctions such as these in Article 41. Under the Charter, however,
such actions are intended to be taken under the direction of the Security Council. U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 41. Nonetheless, the sanctions invoked against the Soviet Union were intended as
"punishment" for violation of customary international law.
84. Transcript of President's Speech, supra note 81; see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1980, at
A3, col. 3. Chancellor Helmut Schmit of West Germany declared that his nation would also
join the boycott if the Soviets did not withdraw. Chancellor Schmit, like President Carter,
indicated that the Soviets were running afoul of international law.
85. Amdur, Boycott Impact to be Felt Today, N.Y. Times, Jul. 20, 1980, § 5, at 1, col. 4.
Some of the nations which did attend, such as Great Britain, did not send a team, but instead
sent a single representative. These representatives carried the Olympic flag in the opening
parade instead of their national flags, as a sign of protest.
86. See SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 65, at iii.
87. THIRLWAY, supra note 22, at 46.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
89. Id. art. II, § 2.
90. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973, H.R.
REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1973, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2346 at
2349 [hereinafter cited as COMM. REP.]; S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973) [her-
inafter cited as S. REP.].
91. S. REP., supra note 90, at 1-2.
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Congress promulgated the War Powers Resolution on November 7,
197392 This legislation was intended to reduce the chances of an
over-zealous President involving the United States in an unwanted
war.9 3 The War Powers Resolution was to insure that the "collective
judgment" of Congress and the President would be used in exercising
war-making powers,94 thereby fulfilling the intent of the framers of
the Constitution that war should be more difficult to start than to
stop.95
A. The Provisions of the Resolution
The War Powers Resolution is composed of ten sections.96 The
operative portions are sections Three, Four and Five.97 These sec-
tions contain the directives that both Congress and the President
must follow to carry out the intent of the legislation. 98  Section
Three, entitled "Consultation," 99 states:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Con-
gress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such intro-
duction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have
been removed from such situations.1l°
A specific definition of consultation was intended for this section.' 0 '
"[C]onsultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on
a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the
President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circum-
stances, their approval of the action contemplated."' 0 2 In addition,
the President himself is expected to participate, and to disclose all
relevant information to Congress.103
92. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13.
93. COMM. REP., supra note 90, at 2346.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 10. Ending a war would be accomplished via a treaty negotiated by the Presi-
dent and ratified by the Senate. On the other hand, declaration of war would require the
consent of both houses of Congress and the signature of the President.
96. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13, at 655-59.
97. Id. Other sections deal with such matters as Purpose and Policy (sec.2), Interpreta-
tion of Joint Resolution (sec.8) and Effective Date (sec. 10).
98. COMM. REP., supra note 90, at 2351-55.
99. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13, at 555.
100. Id.
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Section Four is entitled "Reporting,"'' " and requires the Presi-
dent to report to Congress when American troops are committed to
combat, or to situations likely to result in combat. ' The report is to
be delivered to Congress within forty-eight hours after troops are dis-
patched." 6 Specific information, namely (1) the reasons behind the
use of American troops, (2) the authority under which those troops
were utilized and (3) the expected size of the operation must be con-
tained in the report.'0 7 After delivering the report the President
must continue to report periodically to Congress as long as such an
operation is in progress.10 8 Section Four has two major purposes.
First, it requires the President to consider the legal and constitu-
tional aspects of deploying American troops absent a declaration of
war. 10 9 Second, it attempts to ensure that Congress will be provided
with information to use when considering possible action in response
to the use of armed forces by the President." 0
Section Five is entitled "Congressional Action.""' This section
104. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13, at 555-56.
Sec. 4. (a) in the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United
States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped
for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement,
repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting
forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduc-
tion took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress
may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with re-
spect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States
Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostili-
ties or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the Pres-
ident shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such
hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of
such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such
hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less
often than once every six months.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 556.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. COMM. REP., supra note 90, at 2346.
110. Id. at 2353.
111. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13, at 556-57.
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contains four directives.'1 2  First, it sets out a specific procedure
which Congress must follow when a report required by section Four
is submitted."1 3 Second, it provides a procedure which Congress
must follow if it is not in session when such a report is submitted. 114
Third, section Five denies the President the authority to commit
American troops for more than sixty days without obtaining the ap-
proval of Congress. i" 5 Fourth, Congress is authorized to use a con-
current resolution" 6 to order the President to withdraw any troops
from hostilities abroad at any time during or after the sixty-day
period. 7
The authors of the War Powers Resolution believed that its pro-
visions would help solve problems which had developed concerning
the power to wage war. It was hoped that the original constitutional
balance of war-making powers between Congress and the President
Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted
to the Speaker of the House of Represenatives and to the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report
is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in
excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at
least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request
the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take
appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall termi-
nate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was
submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or
has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2)
has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a
result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be
extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and
certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the
safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces
in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed
Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its posses-
sions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization,
such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.
112. COMM. REP., supra note 90 at 2355.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Actually, congressional inaction could result in a pull out after sixty days (sec.
5(b)).
116. See COMM. REP., supra note 90, at 2357-58. This is an example of a "legislative veto"
provision. A concurrent resolution differs from a joint resolution in that the former does not
require action by the President. In this way, Congress can legislate "around" the President,
and "veto" previous presidential actions. Some legislative vetos require that only one house
take action.
117. COMM. REP., supra note 90, at 2353.
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would be restored."' Instead, the War Powers Resolution appears to
have spawned new complications. "9 The result has been that its
very validity has been challenged.
B. Challenges to the Validity of the War Powers Resolution
1. The Question of Constitutionality. One challenge to the War
Powers Resolution is that it may be at least partially unconstitu-
tional. 20 One line of argument proceeds from the premise that the
Resolution attempts to define the division of war-making powers be-
tween Congress and the President.' 2' According to the 1926
Supreme Court decision in Myers v. United States, the constitutional
separation of powers cannot be altered by one branch of govern-
ment. 122 Accordingly, the War Powers Resolution may be an invalid
attempt by Congress to alter the separation of powers.'
23
A more specific challenge arises from the recent Supreme Court
decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. 24 In
Chadha, a challenge was raised to the constitutionality of a section of
the Immigration and Nationality Act 2 5 that allowed either house of
Congress to utilize a legislative veto to nullify actions taken by the
United States Attorney General pursuant to the Act.'2 6 Legislative
118. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
119. At Issue: The War Powers Resolution, 70 A.B.A. J. 10 (1984)[hereinafter cited as
A.B.A. J.]. The deployment of Marines in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada have raised
the issue of the viability of the War Powers Resolution once again. This article presents argu-
ments advanced both for and against the Resolution. Professor John Norton Moore of the
University of Virginia argues that the War Powers Resolution is of doubtful constitutionality.
Frederick S. Tipton, Chief Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argues that it is
constitutional and enforceable.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926).
123. But see S. REP., supra note 90, at 1. The view of the authors of the War Powers
Resolution was that it fulfilled the intention of separation of powers rather than altering it.
124. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976).
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
section-If during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to
the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is
reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating
in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney
General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary depar-
ture at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by
law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Repre-
sentatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation
proceedings.
126. See generally Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congres-
sional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982). Considerations of efficiency and continuity have
dictated that Congress delegate some of its powers to the executive branch. The result has been
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vetoes had often been used by Congress to regulate legislative power
delegated to the executive branch. The United States Supreme Court
held that the legislative veto, as used in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, was unconstitutional 27 because it violated the doctrine of
separation of powers. 28  An appendix'29 to the Chadha opinion
listed fifty-six statutes which contained legislative veto provisions, in-
cluding the War Powers Resolution. 3 ° However, the ultimate effect
which the Chadha decision will have upon the War Powers Resolu-
tion remains unclear.' 3 ' Although broad language was used to strike
down the legislative veto, the ruling in Chadha was addressed specifi-
cally to the Immigration and Nationality Act.' 3 2 While it has been
argued that the legislative veto found in section Five of the War Pow-
ers Resolution is now invalid,'33 the ruling in Chadha has not actu-
ally been applied to that provision.' Neither the general
constitutional challenge to the War Powers Resolution nor the spe-
cific challenge to its legislative veto provision has been resolved.' 35
Consequently, the constitutionality of this legislation remains in
limbo.
2. The Question of Politics. In addition to constitutional at-
tacks which have cast a pall over the future of the War Powers Reso-
lution, there have also been problems in enforcing its terms. In
practice, the War Powers Resolution has met with resistance from
the White House.' 3 6 Disputes between the President and Congress
have flared each time a situation has arisen where the War Powers
the creation of such agencies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Congress has used the legisla-
tive veto as a "leash" on agencies exercising delegated congressional powers. In this way
Congress avoided the complete abandonment of these delegated powers to the President. The
President appoints the officials who head various agencies, thereby influencing their functions.
127. See I.N.S. v. Chadha 103 S. Ct. at 2786-88.
128. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I.
129. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2811
130. Id.
131. A.B.A. J., supra note 119, at 10.
132. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786-88.
133. A.B.A. J., supra note 119, at 10.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control
Over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 614-22 (1977). This article examines five exam-
ples of past situations where the War Powers Resolution was applicable. It was used in varying
degrees and with various accompanying reasons for the President's actions. The author con-
cludes that any effort made by the President to comply with the Resolution was carefully char-
acterized as an exercise of the Commander-in-Chiefs power. There was to be no appearance of
compliance with any legal obligation.
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Resolution was applicable.137 A recent and pointed example is the
involvement of United States Marines in Lebanon.
On August 20, 1982, President Reagan dispatched 800 Marines
to Lebanon to participate in a multi-national force assembled to keep
order during the evacuation of Palestinian guerillas from Beirut.,
38
Although the Marines left Lebanon after the Palestinian withdrawl,
they soon returned at the request of the Lebanese Government.
1 39
The Marines were posted in the area around the Beirut airport to
help the Lebanese Government maintain "sovereignty" over that
city."4 On August 29, 1983, the Marine positions came under attack
and two soldiers were killed. 41 Many members of Congress felt that
this event triggered the reporting provision of the War Powers Reso-
lution, 42 since in their view the Marines in Beirut had become in-
volved in combat.
143
President Reagan, while stating that he was keeping Congress
informed of the situation, avoided compliance with any portion of
the War Powers Resolution which would impose a time limit on the
Marines' presence in Beirut. " Reagan Administration officials
stated repeatedly that United States Marines in Beirut were not in-
volved in combat.145 On this basis it was agrued that the War Pow-
ers Resolution did not apply to the American presence in
Lebanon. 
4 6
The opposing positions on the Lebanon operation 47 softened
137. Id.




142. See Roberts, Senate Democrats Set to Force Issue Over War Powers, N.Y. Times, Sept.
16, 1983, at Al, col. 6; Weisman, White House Warns a War Powers Fight Hurts U.S. Interests,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
143. Roberts, President Pressed to Seek Approval for Marines' Role in Lebanon, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 15, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
144. Gwertzman, Officials Call Attacks a Surprise; U.S. Role in Lebanon Questioned, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
145. Gwertzman, Marines Are Neither Combatants Nor Targets in Beirut, U.S. Insists, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 1, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
146. Id.
147. See Halloran, US. Weighing Policy Options in Beirut Clash, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1983,
at A1, col. 5. At this point, the Administration was hoping for a joint resolution from Con-
gress which would support its plans in Lebanon. At the same time, there was a move in Con-
gress to cut funds for the Lebanon operation until President Reagan invoked the War Powers
Resolution. In the end, the Administration proved more successful in attaining its goals.
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gradually as the situation there became more hostile.' 48 Although
many in Congress felt that invocation of the War Powers Resolution
was mandatory,'49 the leaders of Congress pursued negotiations with
the President. 5 ° These negotiations eventually resulted in a "com-
promise resolution"'' which applied a limited version of the War
Powers Resolution to American actions in Lebanon. 5 '
The compromise resolution differed from the original War Pow-
ers Resolution in several key aspects.'53 First, the reporting section
of the compromise resolution included only one of three original re-
quirements: the periodic report requirement of section 4(c) of the
War Powers Resolution.' 54 Second, the compromise resolution
lacked any provision which would allow Congress to force with-
drawal of the Marines by concurrent resolution.'55 Third, the Presi-
dent was authorized by the compromise resolution to keep United
States forces in Lebanon for up to eighteen months.' 56 In contrast,
application of the War Powers resolution would have allowed for
only sixty days of troop involvement without special approval of
Congress.' 57 Finally, the compromise resolution contained a section
endorsing President Reagan's actions in Lebanon.' 58 No such en-
dorsement provision was included in the War Powers Resolution.' 59
The diluted terms used in the compromise resolution are illus-
trative of the situation confronting the original War Powers Resolu-
tion. The legislation's terms are being eroded by persistent
reservations about their constitutionality"6 and hesitancy about their
application. t6 ' The general question of the viability of the War Pow-
148. See Smith, Reagan Upgrading Lebanon Presence, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1983, at Al,
col. 5.
149. See N.Y. Times, supra note 138.
150. See Roberts, supra note 143. House Speaker O'Neill took the lead in placating House
Democrats and encouraging a compromise resolution to "invoke" the War Powers Resolution.
151. Roberts, Congressional Chiefs Back Compromise on War Powers; Reagan is Expected
to Sign, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
152. See Appendix.
153. Compare Appendix with notes 104-11.
154. See Appendix, § 4.
155. Id.
156. See Appendix, § 6.
157. See supra note I11.
158. See Appendix, § 5.
159. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13.
160. Erlich, The Legal Process in Foreign Affairs: Military Intervention--a Testing Case, 27
STAN. L. REV. 637, 648 (1975). President Richard Nixon declared both sections 5(b) and 5(c)
to be "clearly unconstitutional" in his message to Congress when he vetoed the War Powers
Resolution. Since that time, the constitutional attack has continued, as was seen above.
161. See Franck, supra note 136; A.B.A. J., supra note 119.
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ers Resolution's has therefore become a matter of which specific pro-
visions remain workable in spite of these challenges.
C. Current Prospects for the Resolution
The language of the War Powers Resolution currently remains
in the statute books unchanged 62 from the version originally
promulgated by Congress in 1973.163 Any challenge to its viability,
however, could have three possible consequences. First, and most
drastic, would be a declaration by the United States Supreme Court
that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional in its entirety.'
64
If the argument that this legislation is an attempt by Congress to
alter the separation of powers 165 were to be succesfully advanced, the
precedent established in Meyers v. United States would dictate that
the War Powers Resolution be struck down.
t 6 6
The second possibility is that only the legislative veto provision
in section Five of the War Powers Resolution will be declared uncon-
stitutional.' 67 The legislative veto is the strongest directive for con-
gressional action found in section Five, 16  as it allows Congress to
order the President to withdraw troops from hostile situations
abroad.' 69  If the veto is challenged in court, the Chadha17 ° ruling
will provide precedent for striking the veto provision from section
Five. 171
The final possibility is that the War Powers Resolution will be
nullified through neglect. 172 Since its inception the War Powers Res-
olution has been studiously avoided by American presidents.
17 3
Moreover, Congress has avoided invoking and thereby testing the
Resolution. In the case of the Marine presence in Beirut, Congress
162. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1976).
163. War Powers Resolution, supra note 13.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
165. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 52.
166. Id.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 124-35.
168. See COMM. REP., supra note 90, at 2355.
169. See supra note 111.
170. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2764.
171. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (1976). This section is a severability provision. By its terms, any
portion of the Resolution found unconstitutional can be stricken without affecting the rest of
the bill. For a discussion of severability and legislative veto provisions, see Spann, Deconstruct-
ing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A
Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984); Comment, Severing the Legislative
Veto Provision: The Aftermath of Chadha, 21 Cal. W. L. Rev. 174 (1984).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 136-61.
173. See Franck, supra note 136.
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was persuaded to enact special legislation rather than utilize the War
Powers Resolution itself. 74 If the terms of the Resolution are never
put to use, Congress and the President will render it void, just as if
the Supreme Court had struck it down.
The United States Government appears to be poised to eviscer-
ate the War Powers Resolution. Supreme Court action or general
government inaction could completely nullify the legislation. Strik-
ing out the legislative veto provision would be less devastating, but
would still deny Congress its strongest lever. Even if Congress were
willing to implement the War Powers Resolution, without a strong
provision for direct action legislators would be stymied if the Presi-
dent chose to ignore the Resolution's terms. Although these conflicts
present many significant domestic issues, they are broader and more
long-ranging than they may seem. The effects of the challenges to
the War Powers Resolution extend beyond the realm of national leg-
islation to international law as well.
III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AS INTERNATIONAL LAW
The War Powers Resolution was intended to reduce the chances
of an over-zealous President unilaterally involving the United States
in an unwanted war.175 Instead it seems to have become the battle-
ground for a power struggle between Congress and the President.' 76
Even in the face of such an apparent failure of purpose, the War
Powers Resolution still has a positive function. It is-in its purpose
if not in its application-a State action reinforcing the customary
rule embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.' 77 As such, the
War Powers Resolution is a contribution to customary international
law.
A. Parallel Purposes
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter was drafted as a mea-
sure restricting the use of armed force by UN members. 7 ' The War
Powers Resolution was drafted as a measure restricting the use of
armed force by the United States Government.' 79 The specific meth-
174. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
176. Roberts, supra note 143, § 1, at 6, col. 3.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68; see also supra note 71.
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ods employed by these two provisions are different, but their pur-
poses are the same.
The Charter is a broadly-worded document intended to lay the
foundation for an international organization.' Article 2 sets out the
principles by which that organization will operate. 18 ' As one of these
principles, paragraph 4 of Article 2 is declaratory. Members of the
UN shall refrain from using armed force. 182 As previously discussed,
this is the contemporary statement of a rule of customary interna-
tional law.'8 3 The mechanics for following this principle rule are left
to other provisions and other documents.1
8 4
The War Powers Resolution is not a broadly-worded document.
It contains a specific set of directives for the conduct of various
branches of the United States Government.18 5 The consulting 8 6 and
reporting8 7 requirements provide that both political leaders and
legal experts must be consulted before any decision to dispatch
United States forces to hostile situations abroad may be reached.'
8
These provisions are designed to help avoid irrational or emotionally-
charged decisions to use armed force.' 89 The provisions for congres-
sional action provide a direct method for removing United States
forces from actual or potential combat situations. 9o Taken together,
these directives provide the mechanics for achieving the ultimate pur-
pose of the War Powers Resolution: avoiding the unnecessary use of
force.' 9 '
The comparison of Article 2(4) and the War Powers Resolution
illustrates the parallel intent of the two instruments. However, it
may seem to be a fairly empty exercise. The drafters of the War
Powers Resolution probably did not have Article 2(4) in mind as
their primary model. The Resolution does not direct the United
States government to refrain from the threat or use of force in any
180. See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 69, at 3-20.
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 2. "The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Pur-
poses stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles." Id.
182. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also supra note 71.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 73-87.
184. In all, the UN Charter contains Ill articles, which set up machinery to implement its
purposes and principles, as well as declaring the intention of Member States to follow its
directives.
185. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 13.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
187. See supra note 104.
188. Erlich, supra note 160; see also supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
189. See S. REP., supra note 90, at 1-2.
190. COMM. REP, supra note 90, at 2353.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
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manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 192 In-
stead, the President is directed to report to Congress when force is
used abroad, and certain powers are reserved by Congress regarding
such uses of force.' 93 The War Powers Resolution thus appears to be
much more of a power-sharing arrangement between two branches of
the United States Government than an action reinforcing customary
international law.
It is precisely the parallel intent of Article 2(4) and the War
Powers Resolution, however, that reinforces and contributes to cus-
tomary international law, independent of any specific language which
the legislation might contain.'94 The essential building blocks of
customary international law are norms of State conduct, built upon
past actions and influencing future actions.' 95  It is an interplay
which has involved United States government institutions since their
inception. 1
96
1. The Influence of Customary International Law on United
States Practice. In 1820 the United States Supreme Court decided
United States v. Smith.'9 7 In Smith, the constitutionality of a crimi-
nal statute was challenged on the ground that it was vague in its
definition of the offense. The statute imposed capital punishment for
192. Indeed, most references to the use of force in preparatory documents on the War
Powers Resolution are concerned with who may exercise war powers. Much attention appears
to have been focused on which branch of government was granted superior war-making author-
ity by the Constitution. Thoughts of curbing the use of force were expressed largely in connec-
tion with the Vietnam War, and even then the motivation was often the avoidance of another
such "loss" in the future. See War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Secur-
ity and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); CoMM. REP., supra note 90; S. REP., supra note 90.
193. See War Powers Resolution, supra note 13.
194. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 112-20. When Professor Brownlie traces the
customary international law concerning the use of force, he focuses on the principle which is
the essence of the rule. He follows that principle through its various manifestations in State
practice. Custom by its very nature is not often reduced to a certain set of words. Rather, it is
a way of doing things. In tracing the rule stated in Article 2(4), Professor Brownlie looks at a
variety of State actions, some of which refer expressly to Article 2(4) and some of which do not.
Their common purpose is what places them in the line of development of a customary rule:
their effect on State actions rather than their use of language is what contributes to customary
international law.
195. See THIRLWAY, supra note 22, at 30-37.
196. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The framers of the Constitution placed treaties in the
Supremacy Clause along with the Constitution itself and laws of the United States. Declaring
treaties to be part of the "supreme law of the land" shows a recognition of the interrelation of
international law with domestic United States law.
197. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
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"the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations." '198 It was
argued that this language gave insufficient notice of the elements of
piracy to potential defendants. The Court disagreed. The content of
customary international law was held to be sufficiently definite for its
incorporation into the statute to withstand the consitutional chal-
lenge.' 99 The Smith case shows the influence of customary interna-
tional law on the domestic law of the United States at an early stage
in our history. Congress incorporated a customary rule into a crimi-
nal statute. The Supreme Court consulted customary international
law in its deliberations and found the evidence provided there to be
dispositive of an issue raised under the Constitution.
In Smith, the Supreme Court sought to impliment the intent of
Congress in enacting the piracy statute. Since the customary defini-
tion of piracy was expressly referred to in the statute, the language
used made it fairly obvious that the intent of Congress was parallel to
that of the States whose practice had established the customary inter-
national law of piracy. 2°° More recently, United States courts have
been faced with questions of customary international law which have
not involved such clear-cut statutory language. The intent of Con-
gress has required definition by the court involved, in conjunction
with a comparison of that intent with emerging rules of customary
international law. These processes were carried out in the cases of
Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala 201 and Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson.2° 2
The earlier, and perhaps more famous of the two is the Filartiga case.
Filartiga involved interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute,20 3
which gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over any civil
action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the
198. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of
Piracy, ch. 77, § 5, 2 Stat. 510 (1819).
199. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) at 160-61. The challenged statute remains
in effect, essentially unchanged. 18 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
200. In seeking to punish the crime of piracy, Congress relied on a definition of the offense
which had developed into a rule of customary international law by years of State practice. For
a discussion of the use of customary international law in United States legal institutions, see
Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public International Law, 8 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 292 (1982).
201. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
202. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Following the same basic reasoning as Filartiga, this case
found an enforceable international human right to be free from arbitrary imprisonment. To
avoid repetition, only the Filartiga case will be discussed infra.
203. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1976).
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law of nations. 2" In Filartiga, the phrase "law of nations" was used
differently than it was in the statute involved in Smith. Instead of
confining the incorporation of international law to one offense, Con-
gress simply used the term "tort." It was left to the courts to deter-
mine what constituted a tort under the law of nations. Courts were
thus expected to match the intent of Congress with the existing state
of international law at the time a particular suit was brought.20 5 In
Filartiga, the Court was asked to hold that physical torture by gov-
ernment officials was a violation of the law of nations, and as such
was conduct intended by Congress to fall under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute.2 °6 After examining relevant actions taken by States collectively
and individually, the Court found that official torture was indeed a
violation of the law of nations.20 7 Although the customary rule
prohibiting such torture had not evolved until after the enactment of
the Alien Tort Statute, the intent exhibited by Congress through the
statute was shown to comprehend the subsequent, parallel interna-
tional legal principle.20 8
The Smith and Filartiga cases illustrate the influence that cus-
tomary international law has had on the law of the United States
through express incorporation by Congress and through court inter-
pretation.2 0 9 The relationship has not been one-sided. While the
above examples have discussed the influence of international law
upon the United States, United States practice has also had its effects
upon customary international law. In a least one instance, this effect
has been dramatic.
2. The Influence of United States Practice on Customary Inter-
national Law. One of the most striking instances of the influence of
United States practice on customary international law began in 1945
when President Truman signed Presidential Proclamations 2667210
204. Id. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the United States."
205. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880. The first analysis undertaken by the court
was an examination of the law of nations.
206. Id. at 880-81.
207. Id. at 881-85.
208. Id. at 884.
209. The statute in the Smith case made express reference to the "law of nations," while in
Filartiga the court interpreted a statute to include a rule of customary international law not in
existence when the statute was enacted. While examples such as these may not occur daily,
they do occur with sufficient frequency that the West Publishing Co. includes international law
in its "key number" system of case digests.
210. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
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and 2668.2" These proclamations established limited United States
jurisdiction over certain areas of the high seas, 21 2 that part of the
ocean over which no State exercises sovereignty.21 3 In Proclamation
2667, the United States claimed jurisdiction and control over all min-
eral resources in the continental shelf contiguous to its coast.
21 4
Proclamation 2668 established "conservation zones" in areas of the
high seas contiguous to United States territorial waters which, with
the advancement of technology, had been developed as fisheries.21 5
The idea of a State claiming any degree of control over the high seas
was new to international law.21 6 Nevertheless, so many States fol-
lowed the lead of the United States by enacting various similar provi-
sions that by 1958 limited jurisdiction over continental shelf minerals
and coastal fisheries was established as a rule of customary interna-
tional law.21 7 The actions taken by other States varied from the
United States model,21 8 and the exact limits of this limited jurisdic-
tion are still changing. 2 9  The international legal principle upon
which these actions were and are still based, however, proceeds di-
rectly from the United States action in 1945.220 While the Smith and
Filartiga cases incorporated congressional intent and international
customary principles, the Presidential Proclamations signed by Presi-
dent Truman established principles which were incorporated in vari-
ous forms by other States until they became customary international
law.
211. Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (1945).
212. A fairly concise description of this concept is found in the Convention on the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. The term "high
seas" means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a State. The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Id. arts. 1 & 2.
213. In recognition of the long-standing legal character of the high seas, both proclama-
tions stated that they were not intended to infringe on the freedom of the high seas, save in the
limited ways described therein. Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 210; Proclamation No.
2668, supra note 211.
214. Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 210. The main purpose here was to obtain access
to the oil reserves known to exist beneath the continental shelf. The proclamation emphasized
the character of the continental shelf as "contiguous" to U.S. coasts and "appertaining" to the
United States.
215. Proclamation No. 2668, supra note 211. Here, the concern was that if left unregulated
the fisheries would be quickly depleted through over-fishing.
216. See BISHOP, supra note 32, at 640-44.
217. Id. at 645.
218. See I U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. AND SOC. AFF., LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SERIES 3-47 (1951) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE SERIES].
219. See, e.g., Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Third Conference
on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/wp. 10/Rev. 3 (1980).
220. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, supra note 218, at 3-47.
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B. So Who Cares?
The few examples given above illustrate the "ebb and flow" of
customary international law within United States law, and con-
versely, of United States law within international law. The question
which remains is why this ongoing process should have any bearing
on the War Powers Resolution, a controversial piece of legislation
touted by few, despised by many and ignored by most.
1. The Influence of Customary International Law on the War
Powers Resolution. The wording of Article 2(4) set down a rule that
is now firmly established in the international community. Unbridled
resort to force is illegal; it is against the law of nations. The United
States has invoked this rule and has imposed sanctions pursuant to
its terms. 22' The principle embodied in Article 2(4) was also at least
partly responsible for the drafting of the War Powers Resolution, as
members of Congress feared the unbridled use of force by the
Executive. 2
By their very nature the provisions of the War Powers Resolu-
tion regulate and thereby limit the use of force by the United States.
The President must consult with Congress whenever possible before
forces are deployed. Even if consultation is not possible and troops
are dispatched, the President must still report to Congress on their
activity, and include in his report the legal basis for that use of
force.223 If Congress should disagree with the President's decision to
use force, the War Powers Resolution provides a method for the re-
call of deployed forces.2 24 These three major requirements of the
War Powers Resolution show a clear intent by Congress to place re-
straints on the use of force by the Executive, and thus by the United
States as a whole.2 25 Although customary international law was not
cited as a prime motivation for the drafting of the War Powers Reso-
lution, 26 the influence of custom was present. The customary rule
restricting the use of force developed for very good reasons, as the
vast majority of States have recognized the adverse effects of war
upon all factions involved. 227 The text of the War Powers Resolution
221. Nanda, supra note 82; see also Transcript of President's Speech, supra note 81.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
223. See supra note 104; see also Erlich, supra note 160, at 647-48
224. See supra note 111.
225. See S. REP., supra note 90, at 8-11.
226. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
227. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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and its legislative history reflect this realization.228 However, per-
haps the most important aspect of the connection between the War
Powers Resolution and international law is the possible influence of
the former upon the latter.
2. The Influence of the War Powers Resolution on Customary
International Law. The United States, like every nation, influences
customary international law through its actions. 229  The "super
power" status of the United States places it in an especially influen-
tial position.23° President Truman's proclamations provide a graphic
example of U.S. influence functioning as a catalyst for change. In the
past, the United States has used its influence to nurture the develop-
ment of the United Nations.23 The organization itself was created at
the United Nations Conference on International Organization held in
San Francisco.232 The permanent home of the majority of UN entit-
ites is in New York City, with the United States contributing a sub-
stantial portion of the operating budget.233 Through its continuing
support, the United States helps further both the work of the various
UN organs and the principles under which the UN operates, includ-
ing Article 2(4).
United States support for Article 2(4) has been evidenced on a
number of occasions, including invocation of the rule against Soviet
military actions in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan.
234
However, it has also been argued that the strong influence of the
United States has worked to undermine Article 2(4) through regional
security arrangements such as NATO. 235 This argument postulates
that the opposing political systems represented by organizations like
NATO and the Warsaw Pact make them potential instruments for
carrying out the threat or use of force instead of means of defense
against aggression.236
Presidential proclamations, diplomatic efforts, regional security
arrangements and financial support of international organizations
have all had their effects upon customary international law and upon
228. See COMM. REP., supra note 90.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
230. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 136, at 832-35.
231. GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 12-27.
232. SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 65, at iii.
233. GOODRICH, supra note 12.
234. Nanda, supra note 82.
235. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
236. Id. at 832.
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Article 2(4) in particular. All are United States actions which have
been influenced by customary international law and have in turn had
a reciprocal international influence. It has been shown that United
States legislation is influenced by customary international law. 237 It
seems logical that the War Powers Resolution, as legislation by a
very influential State, would have a reciprocal impact on customary
international law by providing further evidence of the content and
validity of the rule found in Article 2(4).
The War Powers Resolution imposes what are in effect strictures
on the use of force by the United States. These strictures place it in
alignment with the rule of customary international law found in Arti-
cle 2(4). The pieces appear to be in place for a strengthening of this
rule via United States practice in conformity with its terms. 238  How-
ever, the Resolution currently provides only a nominal showing of
conformity; its potential impact on international law is being stymied
by pendent constitutional and political problems. 239 The situation is
worthy of concern since the customary rule found in Article 2(4) has
indeed been undermined as global political relationships have fluctu-
ated. There is merit in the argument that factors such as regional
security organizations and increased nuclear capability are hamper-
ing compliance with Article 2(4).24' Even positive supporters of the
UN Charter admit that Article 2(4) has encountered problems.241 A
strong showing of support by the United States would be very help-
ful, and may in fact be necessary in order to avoid further erosion of
a rule of customary international law which evolved as a result of the
hard lessons learned in modern warfare.
While it is true that the War Powers Resolution does not pro-
vide all of the answers, it could nevertheless proffer a great service in
237. See supra text accompanying notes 197-202.
238. The argument that the influence of "super powers" like the United States is undermin-
ing Article 2(4) also has a converse. The War Powers Resolution, by conforming the practice
of an influential State to the strictures of Article 2(4), would presumably influence other States
to follow suit. Compare Franck, supra note 235, with Zabloki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past
Record and Future Promise, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 579 (1984).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 120-74.
240. A pointed example is the way in which the United States became involved in the
Vietnam War. The United Sates was a member of SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation, a regional security organization established pursuant to Article 52 of the UN Charter.
By special protocol, the members of SEATO agreed to extend the collective self-defense provi-
sions of the Southeast Asia Treaty to designated territory not governed by any of the Member
States. One such area was Vietnam. KEESING PUBLICATIONS, TREATIES AND ALLIANCES OF
THE WORLD 187-90 (1968).
241. Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 544 (1971).
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the international community. Article 2(4) represents the attempt to
structure a long-term solution to the problems associated with the
use of force by utilizing the rule of law. By helping to ensure the
continuation of that effort, the United States could secure long-term
benefits for itself and the community in which it operates. Unfortu-
nately, the focus of many of those who will determine the fate of the
War Powers Resolution is short-term and political. The most immi-
nent of the threats to the Resolution previously discussed appears to
be that of neglect.2 42 The political climate in Washington D.C. has
made it an unpopular piece of legislation. Even so, the very fact that
the War Powers Resolution is legislation - a "rule of law" - has
had an effect on United States practice. Although religiously avoided
through the first years of its existence, the War Powers Resolution
came into play at least marginally during the most recent United
States troop deployment in Lebanon. 243 According to one of the
Resolution's authors, even though the version of the War Powers
Resolution enacted concerning Lebanon was criticized as a "blank
check" to the President, the process did have viable functions. The
"Lebanon War Powers Resolution": (1) limited the function,
number and length of stay for all troops, (2) affirmed the right of
Congress to change its judgments at a later date and (3) required
further congressional approval for any expansion of the American
presence in Lebanon. 2 In these functions was found a step forward,
from absolute avoidance to grudging acceptance of the War Powers
Resolution.24 5 Similarly, although little formal action under the War
Powers Resolution was taken regarding the invasion of Grenada in
1983,246 the threat of congressional action did have its effects. The
Reagan Administration elected to remove the vast majority of United
States combat troops from Grenada before the sixty-day time limit
would have expired.24 7
The analysis of the War Powers Resolution's effect on custom-
ary international law thus returns to the notion of parallelism. The
impact of the Resolution on United States practice reflects the logic
behind utilizing the rule of law in the international community.
Even though it has yet to be formally invoked, the mere presence of
the War Powers Resolution has arguably served a mitigating func-
242. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
243. Zabloki, supra note 238, at 579, 594.
244. Id. at 595.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 596.
247. Id. at 597.
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tion in the use of force by the United States simply because it is the
law of the land. The dynamics of practice are very different on the
international scale, but the basic parallel between the War Powers
Resolution and Article 2(4) can be drawn in this respect as well as in
their root purposes. Article 2(4) also represents law: customary in-
ternational law. Its impact on the international community derives
from that very fact. Moreover, the increasingly dire consequences of
war which precipitated the formulation of the rule provide a very
practical motivation for acknowledging its terms. 248 Drawing a par-
allel on this level, the possibility for United States influence on cus-
tomary international law thus becomes two-fold. Not only does the
War Powers Resolution represent further State practice contributing
to the continued validity of customary international law, it also
shows that the rule of law can indeed impact the use of force by
States. As a guide for future action by the United States, the War
Powers Resolution could conceivably do more to preserve and de-
velop the customary rule of Article 2(4) than a diplomatic communi-
cation, treaty, constitution or money donation.2
Present military capabilities make the "fear of war" factor a
very real consideration in the daily operations of the international
community. General consensus exists in favor of taking steps to re-
duce the threat of war. The question of what those steps should be,
however, gives rise to heated debate. The rule of law is one avenue
being explored in the search for international peace and stability.
Problems encountered by advocates of the League of Nations and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact have given rise to criticism that it is naive to
seek peace by "legislating" against war. Considering the gravity of
the issues involved, such criticism appears facile and short-sighted.
If answers are to be found for the escalating problems of warfare,
every alternative must be actively pursued. The customary rule re-
stricting the use of force has persisted, indicating a viable belief that
the rule of law is an alternative worthy of pursuit. The War Powers
Resolution represents the potential for a valuable contribution to cus-
tomary international law, and any consideration of its viability must
take this factor into account. Failure to do so would be a disservice
to the international community.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 45-72.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 25-42.
250. See supra note 238.
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The consequences of waging war have become more dire as
technology has advanced. In recognition of this fact, State practice
has changed, giving rise to a new rule of customary international law
restricting the use of force. In 1945 this rule was refined and set out
as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Since then, State practice has
continued to affirm and develop this customary rule. In 1973 the
United States Congress passed the War Powers Resolution.
Although not an overt statement of customary international law, the
Resolution's terms were designed to curb the use of force by the
United States. In that way, the War Powers Resolution had the po-
tential for becoming a valuable contribution to customary interna-
tional law. However, political and constitutional worries have
hampered the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution. These
problems could actually undermine Article 2(4)'s customary rule,
which depends upon the continued practice of States for its viability.
Working to solve the problems of the War Powers Resolution will
have a beneficial effect on customary international law by demon-
strating the continued adherence of a powerful and influential State
to the terms of Article 2(4).
Thomas Langdon Bell
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APPENDIX
Reprinted from N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1983, § 1 at 16, col. 1.
Providing statutory authorization under the War Powers Reso-
lution for continued United States participation in the multinational
peacekeeping force in Lebanon in order to obtain withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Lebanon.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representative of the
United States of America in Congress assembled.
SHORT TITLE
Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "Multina-
tional Force in Lebanon Resolution."
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
Section 2. (a) The Congress finds that-
[1]
The removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is an essential
United States foreign policy objective in the Middle East;
[2]
In order to restore full control by the Government of Lebanon
over its own territory, the United States is currently participating in
the multinational peacekeeping force (hereafter in this resolution re-
ferred to as the "Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution") which
was established in accordance with the exchange of letters between
the governments of the United States and Lebanon dated Sept. 25,
1982;
[3]
The Multinational Force in Lebanon better enables the Govern-
ment of Lebanon to establish its unity, independence and territorial
integrity;
[4]








United States Armed Forces participating in the Multinational
Force in Lebanon are now in hostilities requiring authorization of
their continued presence under the War Powers Resolution.
(b) The Congress determines that the requirements of section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on Aug. 29,
1983. Consistent with section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution,
the purpose of this resolution is to authorize the continued participa-
tion of United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in
Lebanon.
(c) The Congress intends this joint resolution to constitute the
necessary specific statutory authorization under the War Powers
Resolution for continued participation by United States Armed
Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.
A UTHORIZA TION FOR CONTINUED
PARTICIPATION OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE
MUL TINA TIONAL FOR CE IN
LEBANON
Section 3. The President is authorized, for purposes of section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, to continue participation by
United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon,
subject to the provisions of section 6 of this joint resolution. Such
participation shall be limited to performance of the functions, and
shall be subject to the limitations, specified in the agreement estab-
lishing the Multinational Force in Lebanon as set forth in the ex-
change of letters between the governments of the United States and
Lebanon dates Sept. 25, 1982, except that this shall not preclude such
protective measures as may be necessary to insure the safety of the
Multinational Force in Lebanon.
REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS
Section 4. As required by section 4(c) of the War Powers Reso-
lution, the President shall report periodically to the Congress with
respect to the situation in Lebanon, but in no event shall he report
less often than once every six months. In addition to providing the
information required by that section on the status, scope and dura-
tion of hostilities involving United States Armed Forces, such reports
shall describe in detail-
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[1]
The activities being performed by the Multinational Force in
Lebanon;
[2]
The present composition of the Multinational Force in Lebanon,
including a description of the responsibilities and deployment of the
armed forces of each participating country;
[3]
The results of efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the
Multinational Force in Lebanon;
[4]
How continued United States participation in the Multinational
Force in Lebanon is advancing United States foreign policy interests
in the Middle East; and
[5]
What progress has occurred toward national political reconcilia-
tion among all Lebanese groups.
STATEMENTS OF POLICY
Section 5. (a) The Congress declares that the participation of
the armed forces of other countries in the Multinational Force in
Lebanon is essential to maintain the international character of the
peacekeeping function in Lebanon.
(b) The Congress believes that it should continue to be the pol-
icy of the United States to promote continuing discussions with
Israel, Syria and Lebanon with the objective of bringing about the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and establishing an
environment which will permit the Lebanese armed forces to carry
out their responsibilities in the Beruit area.
(c) It is the sense of the Congress that, not later than one year
after the date of enactment of this resolution and at least once a year
thereafter, the United States should discuss with the other members
of the Security Council of the United Nations peacekeeping force to
assume the responsibilities of the multinational Force in Lebanon.
An analysis of the implications of the response to such discussions
for the continuation of the Multinational Force in Lebanon shall be
Vol. 15
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included in the reports required under paragraph (3) section 4 of this
resolution.
DURATION OF A UTHORIZA TION FOR UNITED STA TES
PAR TICIPA TION IN THE MUL TINA TIONAL
FORCE IN LEBANON
Section 6. The participation of United States Armed Forces in
the Multinational Force in Lebanon shall be authorized for purposes
of the War Powers Resolultion until the end of the 18-month period
beginning on the date of enactment of this resolution unless the Con-
gress extends such authorization shall terminate sooner upon the oc-
currence of any one of the following:
[1]
The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the
President determines and certifies to the Congress that continued
United States Armed Forces participation in the Multinational Force
in Lebanon is required after such withdrawal in order to accomplish
the purposes specified in the Sept. 25, 1982, exchange of letters pro-
viding for the establishment of the Multinational Force in Lebanon;
or
[2]
The assumption by the United Nations or the government of
Lebanon of the responsibilities of the Multinational Force in Leba-
non; or
[3]
The implementation of other effective security arrangements in
the area.
INTERPRETA TION OF THIS RESOLUTION
Section 7. (a) Nothing in this joint resolution shall preclude the
President from withdrawing United States Armed Forces participa-
tion in the Multinational Force in Lebanon if circumstances warrant,
and nothing in this joint resolution shall preclude the Congress by
joint resolution from directing such a withdrawal.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution modifies, limits or super-
sedes any provision of the War Powers Resolution or the require-
ment of section 4(a) of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of
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1983, relating to Congressional authorization for any substantial ex-
pansion in the number or role of United States Armed Forces in
Lebanon.
34
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1985], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol15/iss1/4
